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Abstract 
 
Since ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament’s  (EP) newly conferred 
power in international negotiations is being put to the test through the complex and 
lengthy negotiations between the EU and the US for a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP represents a fruitful area to investigate the way 
in which the EP is utilizing (or underutilizing) its new power as well as implications for 
the EU’s democratic deficit.  TTIP represents a particularly fruitful policy to study the 
EP’s power because it offers the ability to directly compare the EP’s behavior with that of 
the US Congress.  This is so because both legislatures need to assert their authority 
during the course of TTIP negotiations given mutual limitations of an up or down vote 
(consent procedure in the EP, fast-track/Trade Promotion Authority in the US Congress).  
This paper utilizes three controversial areas within each of the three broad negotiating 
areas of the TTIP – genetically modified organisms (market access), Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards (regulations) and Investor State Settlement Disputes (rules) to 
explore the role of the EP.  Preliminary results suggest that powers conferred in the Lisbon 
Treaty to the EP with respect to international negotiations are positively addressing the EU’s 
democratic deficit, at least in the case of transatlantic economic relations. 
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Introduction 
 
Simon Hix (1994) famously argued that as European economic and political integration 
deepened, scholars would find the comparativist toolkit increasingly useful to understand 
the politics and policies of the EU.  A number of scholars, particularly working within a 
federalist framework, have sought to compare EU politics and policymaking with those 
of other federalist states (see, for example, Bolleyer & Börzel, 2007; Burgess, 2004; 
Scharpf, 1988). As European political, economic, and geographic integration (deepening 
and widening) has continued apace, scholars have increasingly looked to the US as a 
potential referent for comparative analysis, and doing so through a wide variety of lenses 
such as the regulatory state (Majone, 1994), federalist organization (Buonanno & Nugent, 
2013; Sbragia, 2007; Schütze, 2009), power-sharing dynamics (Bolleyer & Börzel, 2007; 
Fabbrini, 2007), policy development (Buonanno & Nugent, 2013; Majone, 1996), and 
even the nature of the polity (Baldwin, 2009; Burgess, 2004; O'Neill, 2015).  This paper’s 
methodology draws from this tradition in EU studies. 
 Our paper takes as its starting point the disparate reaction (and traction) among 
civil society organizations and politicians in the EU and the US to the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  Specifically, when the EU and the US agreed to 
begin negotiations on the TTIP, the agreement has been controversial throughout the EU, 
and has become increasingly so as negotiations have proceeded apace.   
In both the EU and the US, the most vociferous opponents of the TTIP are 
Greens/environmentalists, consumer protection advocates, and the “Radical Left” in 
Europe and the “Progressive Left” in the US.  European opponents to the TTIP attempted 
to use the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) called “STOP TTIP” to end the TTIP 
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negotiations, which the European Commission blocked as falling “outside the framework 
of the Commission’s power to submit a proposal for a legal action of the Union” and that  
“the preparatory Council decisions authorizing the opening of international negotiations 
or repealing such authorization do not fall within the scope of the ECI Regulation”  
(EurActiv, 2014).   
Interestingly, however, TTIP opposition has been almost exclusively confined to 
Europe.  Indeed, other than the “usual suspects” - environmental and consumer groups 
(and a few members of the “progressive left” in the US Congress) whose opposition to 
global trade agreements has become part of these organizations’ DNA, those Americans     
aware of the TTIP do not seem particularly opposed (see Pew polling results reported 
inStokes, 2015).  This observation inspires the key question for this paper:  How is it that 
the TTIP opposition seems so organized and effective in the EU, while being nearly non-
existent in the US?  This question is important because in any of the many interpretations 
of the EU, whether  intergovernmental (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1998), multilevel 
governance (Marks, 1993), or those that see aspects of a quasi-federal state  or compound 
republic (Buonanno & Nugent, 2013; Fabbrini, 2007; Sbragia, 1993; Schütze, 2009), the 
EU is not a federal state (even if it is in the process of moving toward federalism), but 
rather (as has been occasionally described) is an “unidentified political object.”  Evidence 
to support this interpretation of the EU as a sui generis construction (neither state nor IO) 
appears irrefutable among the widely agreed view of the EU as suffering from a 
democratic deficit.  Observations employed to support this notion of a democratic deficit 
include low voter turnout for EP elections (as compared to parliamentary elections in EU 
member states – it should be noted that voter turnout at 42.5 percent in the 2014 EP 
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elections is higher than in US congressional mid-term elections, which was 36.4 percent 
in 2014), presumed lack of interest group mobilization (the EU as a construction for 
business, not the “average” European and certainly not the “engaged” European  
consumer advocate or environmentalist), and in the 2014 EP election, 25% of the seats 
captured by anti-EU/system political parties (see Table 1).    
The idea of a democratic deficit, then, suggest a conundrum – is European 
opposition to the TTIP simply a non-conventional political participation (protests, 
petitions) activity (lending support to the democratic deficit argument), or, rather is 
opposition to be found among conventional channels (through political parties and 
interest groups)? If the latter, the TTIP would represent a policy issue in which the EU is 
behaving much more like a state with a polity than an unidentified political object with 
only weak linkages connecting the polity and their political leaders.   
  The purpose of this study is threefold:  first, to examine and comment on the 
nature of opposition to the TTIP in the EU and the US; second, to utilize examples from  
TTIP “chapters” to illustrate the ways in which opposition has influenced TTIP 
negotiations, and the sources of such opposition – conventional? unconventional?; and, 
third, to understand how “domestic” opposition in the EU informs our understanding of 
the nature of EU integration particularly with respect to the development of a distinctly 
European polity (nation) operating within defined political institutions (democratic state).   
 The first part of this paper briefly reviews the benefits of the TTIP for the EU.  
The second part suggests that there was a great deal of early support for the TTIP among 
European leaders and decision makers; and, indeed it could be argued that it was 
Europeans, not Americans, who led the drive to revive the longstanding idea of a 
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transatlantic marketplace. (This is important consideration because if the EU revived the 
idea of a transatlantic trade partnership, why then would opposition be associated with 
Europe?) The third part discusses three cases where opposition to the TTIP has emerged 
in Europe.  These cases are drawn from each of the three general categories that will 
comprise the TTIP agreement – market access (GMOs), regulations (Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards), and rules (Investor-State Dispute Settlement – ISDS). The 
fourth part draws on the findings to explore trust, transparency, and democracy.  The 
paper closes with a preliminary/tentative observation as to the extent to which the TTIP 
controversy assists us in understanding the state of play in European integration, and 
particularly whether the controversy surrounding the TTIP can contribute meaningfully to 
the ongoing debate democratic deficit debate in EU studies. 
Benefits of the TTIP for the EU 
 
Economic 
 
Naturally in a geographic area which trades $2.7 billion/€2.0 billion on a daily basis (US-
EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 2013, p. 1), one would expect there 
to be unrealized economic opportunities if barriers to trade could be eliminated.  This had 
long been the position advanced by proponents in the years prior to agreement to begin 
negotiations on a transatlantic free trade area.  Two European-based research groups – 
the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) (Francois, Manchin, Norberg, 
Pindyuk, & Tomberger, 2013) and Bertlesmann Stiftung (the Bertlesmann 
Foundation) (Felbermayr, Heid, & Lewhwald, 2013) projected GDP growth, job 
growth, and welfare benefits as the result of the TTIP achieving its goals of 
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“comprehensive liberalization” (e.g. elimination of duplicative regulations and 95% tariff 
reduction).    
The eurozone crisis has also changed the dynamics of economic decision-making 
among the eurozone’s members. Together, the large EU economies – France, Germany, 
and the UK – have been unable to provide  the necessary demand and labor markets to 
“jumpstart” the GIIPS.  Given the projected economic growth associated with the TTIP’s 
comprehensive liberalization to post-2008 beleaguered EU member states, one might 
predict a larger reservoir of political will among many EU politicians to complete a 
successful transatlantic trade and investment agreement. 
Geopolitical 
 
Although sometimes overlooked in the predictions of  transatlantic economic growth, the 
TTIP has been also promoted as integral to EU and US power.  Along these lines, 
German Economic Minister, Sigmar Gabriel recently argued: “What I regret in the 
German debate is that so much is said about 'chlorine chickens' and too little about the 
geopolitical significance of this accord…If TTIP were to fail, Germany and Europe could 
come under pressure through developments in other parts of the world” (Reuters News 
Service, 2015).   
 Robert Hormats (2013), Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
Environment, US Department of State commenting along a similar strain that “periodic 
strengthening” of US-European ties was necessary “to ensure that current and future 
generations of Americans and Europeans recognize not only the important legacies we 
share, but also that at present and in the future our common economic benefits and 
security relationships are intertwined.” 
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So, too, Akhtar and Jones (2014, p. 6) observe, the EU and the US “run the risk of 
being disadvantaged in each other’s market in the absence of their own bilateral FTA, 
and that negotiations that were underway for the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) “makes the absence of a U.S.-EU FTA all the more 
notable.”   The, the so-called “Asian pivot” (which the Trans Pacific Partnership 
negotiations seemed to provide ample proof), has been further interpreted by Atlanticists 
as evidence of a weakening transatlantic alliance (Choblet & Hager, 2013, p. 9).  
Early Support for the TTIP in the EU 
  
Center-right and center-left EU member state governments and the center-right holding 
the plurality in the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers looked to 
overseas markets as a business-favorable solution to the obstinately high unemployment 
rates in the wake of the Great Recession.  This is nowhere more evident than in British 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s suggestion to 
US President Barack Obama after his re-election to make a commitment to pursue a 
transatlantic free trade area (Schmitz, 2013).   
Within EU institutions, pressures for export-led growth had been quite intense. 
For example, on the occasion of a TEP conference in May 2012 the governing German 
CDU/CSU parliamentary group issued a discussion paper that was permeated with calls 
for the creation of a transatlantic free trade area. Among specific demands addressed by 
the parliamentary group to the German Government was “pursuing a comprehensive 
approach in negotiating n a free trade agreement between the EU and the USA, which in 
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addition to dismantling customs duties and non-tariff barriers also encompasses, inter 
alia, the liberalization of services and the protection of intellectual property” (CDU/CSU 
Parliamentary Group, 2012).  So, too, a resolution put to a vote in October 2012 to open 
up EU-US trade negotiations easily won in the EP (526 for, 94 opposed, and 7 
abstentions) (European Commission, 2013a, pp. 5 - footnote 2).    
Market Access, Regulations, and Rules 
 
The TTIP can be distinguished from earlier transatlantic cooperation agreements for its 
ambitious objectives, which envisage a wide range of issues divided into three 
categories—market access, regulations, and rules (Akhtar & Jones, 2014, p. 11).  Market 
access covers tariffs on goods and services, government procurement practices, 
government practices regarding service providers, and the presence and perceived 
advantages of state-owned enterprises.  Regulations deal almost exclusively with non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) such as product testing, product specifications, and professional 
licensing.  Finally, a wide range of rules are being negotiated such as a provision for 
investment-state dispute settlement to intellectual property rights. The next two 
subsections focus on GMOs (a market access issue) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards (a regulatory issue), both characterized by longstanding transatlantic disputes.  
The third subsection examines Investor State Dispute Settlement (rules), which only 
recently has proved to be a controversial chapter for the EU. 
Market Access – Genetically Modified Organisms 
 
GMOs have become emblematic of the precautionary principle and a lightning rod for the 
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TTIP negotiations.  This controversy is a longstanding point of disagreement in 
transatlantic trade, arising in part from the disparate risk assessment frameworks and 
subsequent regulations adopted by the EU (precautionary principle) and the US (ex post 
facto litigation). Patterson and Josling (2002) explain that with process regulation (the 
EU approach) the end product is not determinant of regulation, but rather the process:  
thus, if produced by genetic modification, the process and product is regulated differently 
than  traditional agricultural products.  The US approach is the opposite – only the end 
product, not process, is subject to regulation. 
  This early divergence in regulatory philosophy involving GMOS, even with 
respect to the locus of regulatory authority (US Department of Agriculture - agribusiness, 
DG SANCO – citizen health and safety), has had notable effects on EU-US treatment of 
GMOs.  Significantly, the TEFU’s safeguard clause enables EU member states to 
temporarily stop the cultivation or importation of a GMO if the member state determines 
that the scientific evidence suggests harm to human or animal health, or using the 
precautionary principle, is inconclusive.  Six member states – Austria, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Germany and Luxembourg –have applied the safeguard clause to prevent GMO 
cultivation on their soil. 
The EU’s use of the safeguard clause to prevent importation of GMO products 
and the cultivation of GMOs triggered trade disputes with leading agricultural suppliers 
to the EU.  As a result, the US, Canada and Argentina brought a case against the EU 
before the WTO in 2003, citing the lack of scientific evidence used to ban the importation 
and cultivation of GMOs. By November 21, 2006 the WTO had issued three panel 
reports determining that the EU was in violation of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
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(SPS) Agreement, citing lack of “sufficient scientific evidence” for harm to human and 
animal health. This opened the way for the EU’s trading partners to place retaliatory 
tariffs on the equivalent value of imports from the EU (Europa Rapid Press, 2010; World 
Trade Organization, 2008).  And while the EU has settled the dispute with both Argentina 
and Canada, the US-EU dispute over GMO cultivation continues (Europa Rapid Press, 
2010).   Recent legislation permits member states to continue to ban the cultivation of 
GMOs if they are deemed to present a health hazard, but also on new grounds as well 
such as “related to environmental or agricultural policy objectives” or “other compelling 
grounds such as town and country planning, land use, or socio-economic impacts” 
(European Parliament, 2015) 
It is unclear what the impact of this new piece of legislation may be on the 
ongoing transatlantic trade dispute, but will not likely meet the WTO requirement for 
scientific evidence.  Nor does it satisfy GMO opponents in the EU (Vicenti, 2015). 
Another recent development has been Jean Claude Juncker’s appointment to 
European Commission president, who as Luxembourg’s Prime Minister had banned 
GMO cultivation (Waterfield, 2014). It is rumored that one of his first acts as European 
Commission President was to sack the EU chief scientific adviser, Professor Anne Glover 
for her pro-GM views, and eliminate the post of chief scientific advisor (Specter, 2014; 
Waterfield, 2014).   
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), established in 2002, in the 
aftermath of the BSE crisis, is tasked with providing impartial scientific evidence about 
food and feed, including GMOs, to the Commission. Since January 1, 2005 products are 
submitted to national governments for acceptance on the market, in turn, according to 
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Regulation 1829/2003 the member state must immediately forward the application to 
EFSA and EFSA must try to give an opinion to the Commission within six months 
(European Food Safety Authority, 2012).  Regulation, however, has stayed firmly in the 
Commission’s comitology committes. 
The US regulatory process has evolved quite differently.  In 1986 under the 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, it was decided that no new 
laws were needed for the regulation of GMOs.  Instead, the regulations that already 
existed for traditionally produced products would apply to GMOs. As a result there is no 
single statute or federal agency to govern the regulation of GMOs.  Thus, the main 
difference in the structure that has evolved in the US is that there are not separate laws 
dealing with GMOs specifically and regulation is spread across three different agencies, 
whereas in the EU there is a body of directives and regulations that deal exclusively with 
GMOs and the Commission has regulatory authority (housed in DG SANCO) with the 
EFSA serving in an advisory capacity.   This difference has also informed the labeling 
issue – required in the EU, not in the US.  (Recently some US states and municipalities 
have passed GMO labeling laws, but these are facing challenges in federal courts by the 
agribusiness giants.) 
The Commission is fully aware of the European polity’s concern regarding 
the TTIP’s possible impact on GMO cultivation and importation into the EU.  So, 
for example, Agriculture Commissioner Phil Hogan, in an interview with a 
German paper, felt the need to reassure consumers that TTIP would not change 
EU GMO labeling rules and that  
…the European Commission is clear on at least one issue: it will not allow 
any derogation with regard to the recognisability of genetic engineering.  
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Only being able to identify a genetically modified product by scanning the 
barcode on the package, as the Americans are apparently suggesting, is not 
my idea of clear labeling, nor does it comply with existing rules    
(Sagener, 2015). 
 
*** 
This section illustrates that the cultivation and importation of GMOs for human 
consumption (little known is that about 90% of the animal feed in the EU comes from 
GMO crops) has a long history of transatlantic disagreement.  So, too, the EP has been an 
active actor in food safety, dating back to the famous BSE (mad cow) hearings of 1997 
(European Parliament, 1997).  Indeed, the BSE hearings  might be seen as “coming out” 
party for the EP in which the EP firmly established its legislative co-authority with the 
Council to regulate food and feed (Buonanno, Zablotney, & Keefer, 2001).  Given just 
deep seated opposition to GMO cultivation among many member states, one would not 
expect, then, the EP to cede ground on this issue, even if politicians and farmers in some 
member states (particularly Spain and the UK) favor GMO cultivation. 
 
Regulations – Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations 
 
Perhaps the most publicized disagreement in the Atlantic Community (other than the 
“banana wars”)  have been with Sanitary Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, specifically 
practices on the US side (antibiotics, growth hormones, sanitizing methods) that the EU 
considers detrimental to human and animal health.  Neverthless, the HLWG’s (US-EU 
High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 2013, p. 4) report that served as the 
basis for TTIP negotiations recommended: 
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an ambitious ‘SPS-plus’ chapter, including establishment of an on-going 
mechanism for improved dialogue and cooperating on addressing bilateral SPS 
issues…including the requirements that each side’s SPS measures be based on 
science and on international standards or scientific risk assessments, applied only 
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and 
developed in a transparent manner, without undue delay. 
 
 The EU began to ban beef treated with certain growth hormones in 1988, citing concerns 
over health and human safety. In 1996, the US and Canada, countries most negatively 
affected by the ban, brought a case to the WTO requesting the creation of a panel to 
examine the issue. The conclusion of the WTO panel was that “the EC ban on imports of 
meat and meat products from cattle treated with any of six specific hormones for growth 
promotion purposes was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement” (World Trade Organization, 2009). The EU appealed the decision and upon 
appeal it was determined that the EU had not complied with Articles 3.3 and 5.1. The EU 
continued the ban and requested more time, but the US following WTO rulings requested 
from the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) “suspension of concessions to the European 
Communities,” or the right to impose trade sanctions. The DSB determined that the 
nullification suffered was USD 116.8 million, which meant that the US imposed could 
apply compensatory duties equivalent to that level of loss (World Trade Organization, 
2009). US duties impacted EU products such as bovine and swine meat products, 
Roquefort cheese, chocolate, juices, jams and fresh truffles (European Parliament, 2012). 
Negotiations continued with a breakthrough in May 2009 when the US agreed to 
gradually decrease tariffs of EU goods under the condition that the EU increase its quota 
on high quality cuts of beef that do not contain hormones. The US lifted all sanctions on 
the EU over the hormone beef matter in 2011. With the lifting of US and Canadian 
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sanctions certain EU countries benefited such as Italy, with produce worth over US $ 99 
million, Poland, (US $ 25 million), Greece and Ireland (US $ 24 million each), Germany 
and Denmark (US $19 million each), France (US $13 million) and Spain (US $9 million) 
(European Parliament, 2012). 
The EU ban on chlorinated chicken has become a stand in for all that Europeans 
oppose about American food practices, in general, and opposition to the TTIP, in 
particular. While the US accounts for about one-third of all world poultry trade, virtually 
no US exports go to EU countries, the world’s second-largest importer of poultry meat, 
due to US SPS practices  (Johnson, 2015, p. 1).  
  The EU’s ban on chlorinated chicken dates back to 1997 with the banning of 
pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs) (antimicrobial rinses—including chlorine dioxide, 
acidified sodium chlorite, trisodium phosphate, and peroxyacids, among others) that have 
been approved by the US Department of Agriculture  for use in poultry processing to 
reduce the amount of microbes on meat) (Johnson, 2015, p. 1). 
In the EU, instead of treating food borne illnesses like salmonella after the 
slaughter, Europe has sought to control illness in live birds through its “farm to fork 
policy” (Capelouto, 2014).  Flocks of chicken are regularly tested for salmonella and if a 
chicken tests positive the farmer must cull the whole flock, which is credited with 
reducing salmonella to just two percent. 
Part of the divergence is because welfare standards for farmed animals are not 
regulated in the US as they are in Europe (van Horne & Bondt, 2014). Federal legislation 
focuses on transport (US Farm Bill, 1996), slaughtering methods (update 1958) and 
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treatment of laboratory animals (1966), with some degree of latitude for state regulations  
(van Horne & Bondt, 2014). 
EU legislation, on the other hand, focuses to a greater degree on animal welfare, 
the environment and food safety.  Significantly, EU practices are estimated to add an 
additional 5.1% to the total production cost of poultry (van Horne & Bondt, 2014).  
Naturally, Europeans see American SPS practices as unfair competition at the expense of 
animal and human health and welfare.  And clearly American poultry producers enjoy a 
cost-price advantage -  on average 1 kg of live chicken costs 101.1 eurocents, as 
compared to 76.7 eurocents in the US (van Horne & Bondt, 2014). However, much of the 
cost differential can be attributed to lower feed costs in the US, rather than SPS practices.  
Thus, the American negotiating position is that US poultry production is more efficient 
than the EU’s and that the EU is unfairly using SPS practices to protect its poultry 
industry from US competition.  
The EU ban on PRT treated poultry has had a significant negative economic 
impact where prior to the ban, U.S. exports of chicken and turkey meat to the EU (15) 
totaled nearly 38,000 metric tons (MT), valued at $58 million. In 2011, U.S. exports to 
the same15 countries were reported to be nearly 9,000 MT, valued at $13 million. 
Furthermore, USDA analysts believe that almost all of these U.S. exports represent 
“transshipments,” meaning that Europe is not the intended final destination and that 
virtually no U.S. poultry meat is being purchased for the EU market.  Losses to the US 
poultry industry are estimated at between $200 million and $300 million annually 
(Johnson, 2015, pp. 1-2). 
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A great deal of the opposition in Europe to the TTIP has arisen from fear that the 
US will use the negotiations to achieve its long standing objectives of opening up the EU 
to hormone beef and PRT-treated poultry.  This is not an unfounded concern because US 
policymakers have been quite explicit about including SPS in the TTIP.  For example, 
Robert Hormats (2013), the US State Department’s Under Secretary for Economic 
Growth, Energy and the Environment remarked in a speech delivered in the spring of 
2013:  
We aim to address entrenched obstacles to U.S.-EU trade liberalization…while 
SPS issues remain highly contentious, TTIP negotiations provide a real 
opportunity to break down some of the barriers that have kept us from taking full 
advantage of trade opportunities in the past. Our aim is for commitments to base 
SPS standards on science and international standards with an emphasis on 
scientific risk assessments (Hormats, 2013).  
 
Americans sometimes underestimate the depth of the European polity’s concern over SPS 
issues.   Certainly Jean-Claude Juncker, the successful candidate for European 
Commission president (whose EPP group is pro-TTIP) knew the European polity’s 
concern when he quipped during one of the election's presidential debates that “the 
chicken does not want to be chlorinated either” (Fox, 2014).  Naturally, opponents of US 
slaughterhouse practices would be suspicious of the member state motives because when 
the Commission sought in 2009 (based on EFSA’s evaluation of chlorine’s use as a PRT 
to be safe) for the Council to approve chlorine washed poultry, the Council denied 
approval  (Grueff, 2013, p. 12).   
In the first parliamentary debate on the TTIP after the seating of the new EP after 
May 2014 elections, Trade Commissioner De Gucht addressed the SPS issues specifically 
stating, “We won’t import any meat with hormones.  We won’t give blanket approval of 
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GMOs” (European Parliament, 2014).  At these debates, David Martin, MEP (European 
Parliament, 2014) representing the S & D group (whose votes will be needed for the EP 
to approve the TTIP) stated: 
The Socialists were proud to be at the birth of TTIP.  We don't want to be the 
TTIP's assassins.  If we have to be, we will be.  The Commission must listen to us 
about issues such as food safety.  Regulatory convergence must not lead to 
chlorinated chickens, hormone treated beef, or GMOs getting access to the EU 
market.  We’ve had assurances from the Commission on this, and we want to 
remind you that we’re going to continue to watch you. 
Given the longstanding opposition to Europeans to the importation of US cattle, swine, 
and poultry using SPS practices, one can understand the outrage the Council’s (2013) 
TTIP negotiating mandate created when an MEP from the Green group leaked it (the 
negotiating mandate has since been officially published), and was found to contain Item 
#25 (Regulatory Issues and Non-tariff Barriers)  
 
The Parties shall establish provisions that build upon the WTO SPS Agreement 
and on the provisions of the existing veterinary agreement, introduce disciplines 
as regards plant health and set up a bilateral forum for improved dialogue and 
cooperation on SPS issue.     
 
*** 
 
As with GMOs, the transatlantic dispute over SPS is long standing and has involved 
consumer and environmental groups, farmers, the EP, the Commission, and the Council.  
In other words, it was already an issue with which the EU had been quite responsive to its 
polity.   
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Rules – Investor State Dispute Settlement 
 
The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a procedure which allows investors to 
bring claims  against a foreign government instead of requiring their government (state-
to-state) to put forth claims on their behalf when the state has acted inconsistently with an 
investment protection agreement (Akhtar & Jones, 2014, p. 31; Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament, 2014).  ISDS agreements 
are mainly negotiated to protect foreign corporations against discrimination and to protect 
against unlawful expropriation.   
ISDS clauses, which the German government began using in the late 1950s, are 
routinely inserted by the EU and the US in FTAs (Fox, 2014). Indeed, the EU and the US 
have fully anticipated including an ISDS in the TTIP Agreement and the EU-Canada 
FTA contains an ISDS (Council of the European Union, 2013, Item 23; de Pous, Dings, 
Goyens, & Kosinska, 2014).   
There are several reasons why foreign companies favor ISDS, including: courts 
may be biased or lack independence; investors may not have access to local courts in the 
host country (e.g. countries have expropriated foreign investment and denied access to 
local courts); and, countries do not always incorporate into local laws the rules made in 
an investment agreement (European Commission, 2013b, p. 1). 
In line with the overall goals of the TTIP for setting global standards, the EU and 
the US expect that with an agreed ISDS, this system could then be used as a standard in 
third countries where foreign investment protections are weaker.   Other goals drive ISDS 
inclusion as well. Starting with the US perspective – first,  the US is seeking efficiency 
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for its MNCs with a single rule and the ease of one agreement, which would then replace 
the current ISDS agreements the US has with nine of the EU’s member states; and, 
second,  the US argues that  legal protections for investors in the 28 member states are 
uneven (Vieuws, 2014).  From the EU perspective,  TTIP is an opportunity to drive 
uniformity in internal market rules, a long-established pattern of using international 
pressures as a lever to consolidate the single market. 
Within months of the start of TTIP negotiations, however, opposition from 
Europe’s center left parties began to emerge.  The opposition in Germany, in particular, 
could not be ignored.  The leader of Germany’s Social Democrats  wrote a letter to Karel 
De Gucht warning that Germany might not agree to a TTIP Agreement should an ISDS 
chapter be included (Pardo, 2014, p. 4).  Opposition in the EU to an ISDS chapter in 
TTIP became so intense that the Commission postponed negotiations on the ISDS chapter 
in order to carry out an online public consultation, which took place between March 27 
and July 13, 2014 and returned 149,399 contributions, some running into hundreds of 
pages (European Commission, 2014a; A. Gardner, 2015).  But interestingly, the 
Commission’s analysis of responses revealed that 97% (120,000) of Europeans who 
responded to the public consultation were mobilized by eight NGOs opposed to inclusion 
of ISDS in the TTIP and 70,000 of the responses were “identical or very similar” in their 
answers to the 13 questions the Commission posed in its public consultation, with another 
50,000 responses submitted by just one NGO (A. Gardner, 2015).  This prompted a 
senior US official to comment, “In the US, NGOs publish their finances, but in Europe, 
we don’t really know. We need to understand better; everybody should understand who is 
behind the NGOs” (quoted in A. Gardner, 2015).    
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EU policymakers were taken by surprise by the depth of opposition to the ISDS, 
and this would be understandable given that the EU and all but one of the 28 member 
states is party to agreements with ISDS (European Commission, 2013b, p. 1) and EU 
investors have been involved in 53 percent of ISDS cases (Pardo, 2014, p. 1). 
Driving the European opposition to the ISDS have been several high profile cases 
in recent years: the Swedish Energy Company Vattenfall case in Germany challenging 
that country’s law to phase out nuclear power plants, the Philip Morris case in Australia, 
brought under the Australia-Hong Kong ISDS agreement, and Lone Pine Resources 
challenging Quebec’s moratorium on hydraulic fracturing.   
The European public perceptions—whether true or not, fair or not, are quite 
immaterial—are driving opposition to ISDS.  Europeans think Americans are more 
litigious than Europeans (a perception of American legal culture that much of the world 
shares), and, that an ISDS chapter in the TTIP Agreement would expose EU member 
states (and European taxpayers) to multiple lawsuits.  Driving European opposition is the 
fear that US corporations will sue EU member states that pass laws to protect consumers 
and workers after the ISDS is in effect, on the grounds that such regulations reduce 
company profits.  
The Greens, naturally, opposed the ISDS (one of the items prompting the Greens 
to leak the Council’s negotiating mandate in March 2014).  Indeed, “minutes” after the 
European Commission issues its analysis of the public consultation a spokesman for the 
EP’s Green Group declared that the Commission was “’trying to fob off public concerns’ 
and was showing a ‘total lack of respect for the public and civil society and their 
concerns’” (A. Gardner, 2015).   
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But especially troublingly for EU negotiators has been the EP’s S&D group’s 
announcement (whose votes are needed for passage of the TTIP) that it will oppose the 
introduction of an ISDS in the TTIP negotiations on the grounds that ISDS “would mean 
opening the door for big corporations to enforce their interests against EU legislation.  
This would deprive states of crucial policy space in important fields such as health or 
environment” (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the 
European Parliament, 2014).   
 Eliminating ISDS from the TTIP negotiating mandate is no small matter.  As 
Anthony Gardner (2015) points out:  
The support of a qualified majority of EU member states – 15 member states, 
representing 65% of the EU’s population – would be needed for any change to the 
mandate given to the European Commission, which stipulates that an ISDS 
system should be “without prejudice to the right of the EU and the member states 
to adopt and enforce…measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives. 
 
As a result of significant opposition to the ISDS among many MEPs, the Commission has 
suggested that it can be reformed to satisfy the concerns of its opponents.  The 
Commission has recommended, for example, that arbitrators be selected by both 
disputing parties, and, if the parties cannot agree, arbitrators would be appointed from 
lists established by parties to the agreement.  The ISDS chapter would also include a “far-
reaching” code of conduct.  Furthermore, litigation costs could be borne by the losing 
party (diminishing the incentive for lawyers to file frivolous cases) (European 
Commission, 2013b, p. 4).  
*** 
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How does the dispute about inclusion of the ISDS inform our understanding of the 
democratic deficit in the EU?   On an issue as esoteric as the ISDS, one would hardly 
expect widespread interest among the average European voter.  However, what should be 
noted is the extent to which an EU party group (particularly the Greens) and NGOs 
worked together to force a showdown over the ISDS, which not only included an 
unprecedented public consultation but a suspension in negotiations of this chapter.  This 
case does seem to suggest that a coalition of the Left and the Greens (admittedly, 
sometimes one and the same) have been able to influence the TTIP negotiations.  And, 
interestingly, the US Greens and their partners (e.g. consumer and citizen action groups) 
– while, equally opposed to the TTIP – are most notable for their inability to get any 
mainstream traction on ISDS.   
Transparency, Trust, and Democracy 
European Parliament and US Congress 
 
Both the EP and the US Congress must approve the TTIP Agreement.  The role of the EP 
in international negotiations is a relatively new power conferred on the EP in the Lisbon 
Treaty.  Indeed, the TTIP is the EP’s first big test of its power as partners and brokers of 
an agreement that promises to bring major changes in the way goods and services are 
regulated and the economic life of its citizens – in other words, the “bread and butter” of 
legislative politics. 
The current political configuration, reproduced in Table 1, will be in effect when 
the TTIP Agreement is presented for “consent” to the EP.    Protest parties, naturally, 
matter in the EP and not in the US Congress, especially if large numbers of the center-left 
S & D group vote against the TTIP Agreement.     
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Table 1:  Political Groups in the EP 
 
Political Group Seats Ideology  Type TTIP Position 
European People’s Party 
(EPP) 
221 Center Right Mainstream Pro - support 
ambitious 
agenda. 
Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists & Democrats (S&D) 
191 Center Left Mainstream Conditional 
support -concern 
over SPS, ISDS, 
GIs 
European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) 
70 Center Right Mainstream Pro -support 
ambitious 
agenda. 
Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
 67 Center/Center 
Left 
Mainstream Pro, but data 
privacy a special 
concern for 
European 
liberals. 
Non-attached Members (NI) 52    
European United Left/Nordic 
Greens (GUE/NGL) 
52 Far Left  Protest Con 
The Greens/European Free 
Alliance (Greens/EFA) 
50  Protest Con 
Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD) 
48 Far Right Protest Con 
Total MEPs 751    
Total Needed to Pass the TTIP 
Agreement 
376    
Sources: (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group, 2013; European 
Parliament, 2014) 
 
 
In term of political groups, the center right European People’s Party (EPP) and European 
Conservative and Reformists (ECR) groups are the TTIP’s stronger supporters in the EP.  
However, looking ahead to the EP’s vote, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats’ (S&D) support will be needed, and possibly the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group as well to win 376 of the 751 available votes.   
“Protest parties” oppose the TTIP. (Fueling some concern over the eventual fate of the 
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TTIP in the EP is that approximately 25 percent of MEPs come from national “protest 
parties.”)  
But given the Commission’s constant taking of the temperature of the S&D 
group, it is unlikely that a TTIP Agreement would be signed that does not satisfy the 
concern of the majority of the S&D.  Furthermore, while the EP groups generally tend to 
vote along ideological lines, member state does matter.  Several member states are 
predicted to benefit considerably from the TTIP, including two countries with a large 
number of MEPS - Italy and the UK.   
The American political climate indicates that the TTIP will not necessarily benefit 
from deep bipartisan support.  The first clue to difficulty for the TTIP is that the Congress 
had failed to act on President Obama’s request for TPA (fast-track authority) to negotiate 
both the TTIP and the TransPacific agreements (Hughes, 2014).  US Senate Democrats – 
including the (then) Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid – indicated they would not give 
the president this authority prior to the mid-term elections (November 2014) in an effort 
to keep from alienating its political base.  (In January 2014, 12 of the more progressive 
US senators wrote a letter to the Harry Reid opposing renewal of the TPA for the TPP 
and the TTIP – neither a groundswell of Democratic opposition - all are Democrats with 
the exception of Socialist Bernie Sanders of Vermont- nor enough to derail renewal of the 
TPA.)  As a greater percentage of Republicans turn out to vote, especially in mid-term 
elections, the Democratic leadership had to be especially cautious in upsetting its base 
(which could jeopardize turnout).   The political base of Democrats – environmentalists, 
consumer protection advocates, and labor unions (which are suspicious of trade pacts, see 
more on this point, below) – are able to energize their members to vote in mid-term 
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elections.  Therefore, with Democrats fighting to retain control of the Senate in the 2014 
elections (a battle they lost), it was not a fortuitous time for the Obama Administration to 
request renewal of fast-track authority.    
Republicans, on the other hand, support fast track authority for the US President 
because the wishes of the corporate lobbies trump party politics. (But Tea Party groups – 
the populist wing of the Republican Party – oppose fast-track as well, somewhat 
complicating the issue for Republicans.)  Nevertheless, at the time of this writing with 
TPP nearing completion and the TTIP negotiations expected to be mainly completed by 
the end of 2015, Congress is expected to begin debating TPA (Ikenson, 2015). 
What emerges as interesting from a comparative perspective is the similar nature 
of involvement on the part of the EP and the US Congress and particularly the 
opportunity to observe if identical voting rules (consent and TPA) produces similar 
behavior among congresspersons and MEPs.  The Lisbon Treaty’s conferral of power to 
the EP in this area, it might be cautiously advanced at this point, has gone some way 
toward reducing the EU’s democratic deficit by empowering the EP in vote up or down 
on trade agreements. 
But this analysis also suggests that electoral systems matter.  MEPs are elected 
through proportional representation, making legislative body managed through 
coalitional politics.  Congress, especially the House of Representatives, is organized as a 
body in which two sides constantly maneuver for advantage over the other in a partisan 
environment contested by two political parties.  The result is that especially with well-
publicized initiatives – such as the TTIP – party control  matters a great deal.  
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Public stakeholders, civil society organizations 
 
Public debate and stakeholder involvement has clearly influenced the nature and scope of 
the TTIP negotiations in many respects – policy exclusions (American consumers and the 
exportation of natural gas; the audiovisual industry in Europe; the American Left 
opposing the re-opening of Dodd-Frank), the TTIP chapters dealing with market access 
(tariff rates, public procurement), regulatory measures (NTBs, SPS measures), and rules 
(ISDS, geographical indications).   
Civil society organizations are formally represented in the EU’s TTIP Advisory 
Group, which is comprised of individuals representing trade unions (ETUC, T & E, 
Indutriall European Trade Union), consumer organizations (BEUC), trade associations 
(agriculture, automobile, chemicals, food & beverage, financial services, services, 
Association of German Chambers of Commerce, Business Europe),  environmental 
(European Environmental Bureau), health organizations, as well as independent experts 
(European Commission, 2014b).  The group meets regularly (typically monthly during 
TTIP negotiations), discussing relevant TTIP chapters  (European Commission, 2014c). 
Likewise, the US has been engaging in extensive consultation prior to and during TTIP 
negotiations, including fora established during TTIP rounds and the extensive pre-
existing advisory groups associated with the USTR (Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 2014a, 2014b).  
European NGOs opposing the TTIP do so on several grounds – lack of 
transparency in the actual TTIP negotiations, a perception that the US has lower 
consumer protection for data privacy, concerns over losing what is thought to be higher 
environmental, health, and safety protections in Europe, and that the Agreement will 
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open up Europe to America’s lower labor standards.  In general, an apt description of the 
sentiment among opponents of the TTIP in both Europe and the US is that the TTIP is “a 
new bill of rights for multinational corporations” (Hilary, 2014) and that MNCs have 
“captured the TTIP talks” (The Greens-European Free Alliance of the European 
Parliament, 2014).  There is also an element of being “pushed around” by the US.  The 
EU’s ombudsman comments seem to hint at such a sentiment: “I am aware that the 
Commission at times needs to talk to the US confidentially to be able to negotiate 
effectively. However, US resistance to publishing certain TTIP documents is not in itself 
sufficient to keep them from the European public” (quoted in Crisp, 2015). 
While American opposition groups mirror those in Europe, at least three points 
explain their weaker ability to mobilize the public.  First, the NSA spying scandal was a 
direct affront to Europeans, while many Americans took it as “business as usual” for a 
superpower.  For them, Edward Snowden was a misguided whistleblower, at best, and a 
traitor, at worst (the latter view reinforced by his “defection” to Russia).  Second, 
Americans do not have the same level of concern over data privacy as do Europeans.  
Even in light of multiple credit card hacking scandals, Americans are not any less 
inclined to use their credit cards, addicted as they are to not only the credit and 
convenience, but the points, discounts, and cash back offers.   Third, Americans have 
only one target on which they need to focus – Congress, whereas the anti-TTIP forces in 
the EU need to rally support in all 28 member states as well as put pressure on the EP.  
This need to rely on politicians to use their bully pulpit has empowered MEPs in the 
TTIP debate. 
A fine line – secret negotiations and the public’s right to know 
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The EU and the US have attempted to respond to the transparency complaint in several 
ways.  First, within days of a round’s closing, the EU “draws up a report of around 60 
pages for the EU’s member states and EP, which the member states dissect and discuss in 
twice per week meetings” (Andrew Gardner, 2014b).  These reports are restricted, but 
have been the subject of much speculation and complaints by opponents that the 
negotiations are not properly transparent.  The typical pattern is to “move from a position 
paper (setting out the EU’s aims in a particular area), via an outline of a chapter, setting 
out the EU’s proposed structure and ideas for language, to textual proposals and a 
consolidated text, which includes both sides’ positions in legal language” (European 
Commission, 2014c, p. 2).  All papers the Commission sends to the EU have been 
discussed with member states and shared with the EP.  On the other hand, the US does 
“not allow it papers to be made available to member states or the EP, as current practice 
in the US is not to share negotiating partners’ documents with Congress or its own 
advisors” (European Commission, 2014c, p. 2).  For the US part, public officials have 
been meeting with member state officials to try to allay some of the public’s concerns 
(Andrew Gardner, 2014a). Furthermore, the chief negotiators engage in a post-round joint 
press conference, which is posted to EU and US official websites.  There is also a wealth 
of information available on these websites.  So while the intricate details are unknown to 
the public, the subjects being discussed are in the public record.  
Ultimately, however, the EU’s ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, demanded the 
Commission publish its negotiating documents – the first of which were made available 
to the public in January 2015 (Crisp, 2015; European Commission, 2015).  Notably, the 
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US is not publishing its negotiating documents and have faced no meaningful pressure to 
do so.   
Naturally, the necessity of secrecy in diplomacy has long been debated – it served 
as the basis for deTocqueville’s assumption that because secrecy is counter to democracy, 
only authoritarian governments could be skillful at international diplomacy.  Yet when it 
comes to international negotiations, the majority of the electorate tends to tolerate secrecy  
Understanding, perhaps, that “public” bargaining can prevent a country’s leaders from 
obtaining policy objectives deemed to be in the national interest – regardless of whether 
these interests are primarily of an economic or security nature.  Indeed, this point is 
demonstrated by Leventoğlu and Tarar (2005, p. 420) in their use of game theory to study 
the negotiation of trade agreements or treaties:  
…when the two negotiators face fairly similar costs for violating a public 
commitment, a prisoner’s dilemma is created in which both sides make high 
public demands which cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better 
off if they could commit to not making public demands. However, making a 
public demand is a dominant strategy for each negotiator, and this leads to a 
suboptimal outcome. Escaping this prisoner’s dilemma provides a rationale for 
secret negotiations (Leventoğlu & Tarar, 2005, p. 419). 
 
In the meantime, the American and European Left claim that regardless of any agreement 
produced, massive protests will ensure.  The basis of this “warning” is extrapolated from 
the mass protests against the US in free trade negotiations with Ecuador, South Korea, 
and Thailand (Janusch, 2013);  however, the parallel is likely much overblown and  
should be tempered by the recognition that unlike in the EU and the US, civil society in 
those countries has limited access to the levers of power.  
The transparency issue is also a proxy for “trust.”  Timing is everything – and a 
breach of trust between the EU and the US with respect to the NSA spying scandal, 
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emerged just as the TTIP talks were getting underway and as Anthony Gardner, the US 
ambassador to Brussels noted, “trust - or rather the lack of it - is ‘the elephant in the 
room, particularly when it comes to perceptions about privacy of data’” (Fox, 2014).    
Conclusion 
 
If the EP is expected to consent to the TTIP agreement, then the EP must be consulted, 
kept apprised, and have continuous and meaningful input into the negotiation process.  
The result of this new power is that the EP’s position in the institutional structure with 
respect to trade negotiation is remarkably similar to that of the US Congress under TPA.  
Both the US executive branch (the Office of the US Trade Representative) and the EU’s 
executive (the European Commission) are heavily invested in keeping their respective 
legislatures informed and involved in the TTIP progress.   And in this respect, it seems 
that the only directly-elected EU institution has been very engaged in the process, even if 
this engagement sometimes seems (on the surface) more confrontational than US 
congressional activity .   
In conclusion, this preliminary analysis suggests that the new powers conferred by 
the Lisbon Treaty to the EP are positively addressing the EU’s democratic deficit in a 
policy area – economic growth –affecting all Europeans.   
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